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478documentos

25últimos 7 días

arXiv AI Papers

Low-Bit N-Gram Embeddings for Language Models

Many recent open-weight language models use n-gram embedding tables to improve performance. These tables store learned representations of short token sequences, such as pairs or triples of consecutive tokens, which the model retrieves during processing. However, they can require substantial memory: DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash, for example, allocates 196 billion parameters to its Engram n-gram memory. We therefore investigate whether this memory cost can be reduced while preserving the performance improvement that the tables provide. We propose storing n-gram embeddings at low precision and systematically investigate different quantization methods and bit allocations across tables. Across nanochat-, Llama-, and GPT-2-family models trained from scratch, four-bit tables save approximately 75% of table memory while preserving more than 99% of the validation-loss improvement from adding the tables. Using fewer bits leads to a larger drop in performance, although we find that a short fine-tuning phase recovers a significant part of this loss. In addition, reinvesting the saved memory in larger tables can improve performance beyond that of the original full-precision tables while still using less memory. These table memory savings also extend to large existing models: on DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash and Qwen3.8-Flash-Next, low-bit tables save 47-55% of table memory, with perplexity increases of less than 1.2% and largely preserved downstream task performance. These findings establish low-bit precision as a practical way to reduce the memory requirements of n-gram embeddings and use the saved capacity to improve model performance.

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arXiv AI Papers

Co-Recursive Semantic Self-Extension: A Mathematical Foundation for Open-Ended Intelligence

Artificial intelligence has advanced through scale, data, and computation, yet remains bounded by its representational framework. We ask what makes intelligence open-ended. Every inferential system selects meaningful distinctions, limiting what it can learn. Within a fixed purpose, performance reaches a ceiling set by its semantic domain. Teleological succession, in which purposes arise from earlier ones, faces a similar limit: Boolean-closed purpose-transformations exhaust their reachable semantic territory. We shift from purposes to inferential systems. Drawing on Kant and Gödel, we model cognitive states as partial evaluations over a formal language. Unresolved propositions may be undecided or undecidable. Reasoning can resolve the former but not the latter, leaving a frontier for extension. Non-trivial reductions of undecidable propositions expose undecidable intermediate premises whose reflective reification supports multiple decisive extensions. Finite trace-guided generation remains fallible, requiring meta-level selection and polycontextural exploration. Using Kolmogorov complexity, we show that no architecture with a fixed state description, transition mechanism, and initial condition can generate histories incorporating irreducible algorithmic information. Because physical systems are fixed in this sense, we examine collectives. Coupling finitely many finite agents does not remove the bound. Extension requires persistent external memory preserving semantic content and historical coordinates. Collective generative capacity depends on balancing overlap for transfer with difference for generation. We propose semantic self-extension as a design principle: intelligence should not merely resolve ambiguity within existing meanings, but transform unresolved structures into new spaces of meaning, generating new distinctions, questions, representations, and purposes.

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arXiv AI Papers

Diagnosing the Explicit-to-Applied Theory of Mind Gap in LLMs

As large language models are deployed in high-stakes roles such as therapy, education, and personal assistance, their social cognition must be assessed reliably. Current Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks report aggregate scores that conflate two distinct competencies: explicit ToM (recognizing what someone believes) and applied ToM (using that belief to predict behavior). Building on this distinction, we investigate the gap and its recoverability using four structurally diverse benchmarks. Aggregate reporting obscures uneven competence: on SimpleToM, Llama-3.1-8B scores 51.5 percent overall while recognizing mental states at 99.4 percent and predicting behavior at only 28.9 percent. To assess recovery, we compare structured prompting, matched in-context learning, and our proposed Belief-State Test-Time Training (BSTTT), which adapts lightweight parameters on answered support questions through action reconstruction. Across Qwen2.5-7B, Llama-3.1-8B, and GPT-oss-20B, recovery depends on the model, task, and intervention. On SimpleToM, reminders combined with BSTTT improve Llama's behavior prediction by 40.8 percentage points; reminders account for most of the overall improvement, with BSTTT adding 1.3 to 5.5 points beyond reminders across models. Contextual examples often outperform weight updates, while BSTTT remains stronger in specific model-benchmark settings. Temporal belief tracking remains difficult despite partial recovery. These findings show that aggregate ToM scores can overstate applied competence while hiding performance recoverable through targeted assistance. We recommend decomposed reporting of explicit and applied accuracy alongside intervention comparisons that establish which failures are recoverable and under what conditions.

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