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Watch a webinar on using Codex across the software development lifecycle.
Codex just got faster, more reliable, and better at real-time collaboration and tackling tasks independently anywhere you develop—whether via the terminal, IDE, web, or even your phone.
Codex is now powering 70 different applications across a variety of use cases through the OpenAI API.
We’ve created an improved version of OpenAI Codex, our AI system that translates natural language to code, and we are releasing it through our API in private beta starting today.
Large language model agents are increasingly deployed as multi-agent systems rather than as a standalone model operating within a single context. Recent agent harnesses allow the model to instantiate worker agents and to author the executable workflow that coordinates them, shifting the design of system structure from developers to the model at run time. The quality of this organization therefore constitutes a distinct capability, yet existing benchmarks either measure end-to-end task completion or evaluate coordination under structures specified in advance. We formalize this capability as workflow orchestration and introduce WorkflowArena, a benchmark of 145 long-horizon tasks spanning 8 professional domains, from software engineering and formal mathematics to legal analysis and 3D production. Each task specifies an initial workspace and an integrated deliverable composed of interdependent components, which is assessed by a hidden verifier. Agents determine autonomously whether and how to delegate, and all delegation is recorded, enabling joint evaluation of deliverable quality and the organization of the underlying work. Experiments with nine models show that no single configuration performs best across all domains and that systems exhibit distinct delegation strategies: at high effort, Claude models in Claude Code invoke workflows less frequently but with larger worker groups, whereas GPT models in Codex delegate more frequently in smaller units. When the executing model is held fixed on a challenging subset of tasks, workflows authored by Claude Opus 5.5 substantially improve weaker executors, indicating that workflow organization is itself a measurable determinant of task performance.
CodeRabbit uses OpenAI models to govern and trust AI-generated code and Codex to ship 20 times more software with the same engineering team.
Merge uses GPT-6 Astra, ChatGPT, and Codex to review product code and support marketing. Its teams also use AI to plan executive dinners and prepare sales updates.
OpenAI will acquire Pierre Computer Company, expanding Codex’s tools for building, understanding, and reviewing code.
Office documents are now routinely uploaded to large language models (LLMs) for processing. However, an LLM does not always see what a human sees, because it typically reads the text that an extractor produces from the document's underlying Office Open XML (OOXML) files. Depending on the implementation, extractors differ in which OOXML parts they read and how they interpret them, so their output can differ from what Office applications display. For example, by slightly shifting the positions of text boxes on a slide, an adversary can swap the order in which the model reads them while the slide looks unchanged. We show that this extraction divergence is an attack surface for LLM applications. In this work, we first measure what an adversary can exploit by analyzing the widely used extractors that LLM applications rely on. By combining static source code analysis with dynamic analysis, we identify 19 OOXML channels where extractors read content a human cannot see and 12 where they drop content a human can. We also find that widely used extractors ignore display formatting and reading order, so even visible content reaches the model in a different form. Building on these findings, we construct five attacks that lead the model to interpret a document differently from a human reviewer, without injecting any instruction. We test the attacks on four major chat assistants (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, and Microsoft 365 Copilot) and four coding agents (Codex, Claude Code, Antigravity, and GitHub Copilot CLI), and every one of them is misled by at least one attack. Finally, we propose Prism, a lightweight defense that reconstructs the human view from the OOXML specification before passing the text to the model. Prism also generalizes to unseen attack payloads.
Images 2.6 brings faster image generation, GIF creation, more precise editing, and new API controls across ChatGPT, Codex, and the API.
Discover how ChatGPT and Codex are helping engineers accelerate CAD, PCB design, simulation, and other workflows across the physical world.
Discover how Heimstaden uses OpenAI’s ChatGPT Enterprise and Codex to transform property management, cut costs, and empower employees across Europe.
How OpenAI built Pando, a Git-compatible backend designed for the scale of development that Codex makes possible.
OpenAI said that ChatGPT and Codex will draw usage from the same allocation pool after this change.
Large language model based agents increasingly rely on external tools to invoke services and interact with web resources. These tools can evolve through software updates, yet agentic frameworks may continue trusting them without re-verifying their safety after implementation changes. This tool update gap creates a supply-chain vulnerability in agentic systems: because updated tool code executes outside the LLM's context window, malicious functionality embedded in tool updates can bypass defenses centered on model-visible interactions, leaving agents exposed to stealthy, persistent threats that existing in-context defenses can hardly address. To thoroughly investigate this threat, we introduce ETUDE (Exploiting Tool Updates for Direct Execution), an attack that embeds malicious functionality into updates of initially benign tools to produce compromised tools, while preserving their legitimate tool functionality. Unlike prompt-based attacks, ETUDE operates entirely outside the LLM's context and requires no adversarial instructions, thereby bypassing defenses restricted to model-visible content. We evaluate ETUDE across three representative attack workloads and seven widely used commercial and open-source agentic frameworks, including Gemini CLI, Codex CLI, and Claude Code. The results show that ETUDE achieves a 97.6% ASR while maintaining a 95.9% legitimate task completion rate. We further examine existing defenses and find that they provide insufficient protection against this threat. These findings expose a fundamental blind spot in current agent security practices: trust established for a tool does not necessarily remain valid after its implementation updates.
As coding agents gain greater autonomy to modify software repositories, relevant context alone does not define their operational authority. An artifact may be relevant to a maintenance task while being inappropriate to edit; conversely, another artifact may be required even when it is not explicitly mentioned in the request. We explore Boundary Contracts, a machine-readable abstraction that makes task-specific artifact roles (editable, inspect-only, required, and protected) explicit before repository modification begins. We conduct a pilot study on 40 maintenance tasks from a real enterprise repository, comparing the same Codex-based coding agent with and without Boundary Contract information. The boundary-informed condition improves macro edit-selection F1 from 0.440 to 0.682, required-behavior coverage from 0.429 to 0.673, and the number of strictly acceptable patches from 9 of 40 to 18 of 40. To probe whether these gains are explained only by improved file localization, we additionally analyze 21 tasks in which both conditions modify at least one identical file. Differences remain in edit selectivity and patch outcomes, providing initial evidence that explicit artifact roles may influence maintenance behavior beyond localization alone. This pilot does not establish the general effectiveness of Boundary Contracts. Rather, it provides initial evidence for a broader research question: how should the operational boundaries of coding agents be generated, validated, revised, and ultimately enforced as repository-level maintenance becomes increasingly autonomous?
Large language model (LLM) agents extend their capabilities with skills, each with a name, a description, and a body. Under progressive disclosure, an LLM router selects skills by name and description alone and loads only the selected bodies. Skill libraries grow continually as users and agents add new skills. Because the router relies on this metadata, a similar new skill can displace an earlier one, breaking previously correct routing even though the earlier skill and the router are unchanged. This routing interference is aggravated for public skills, whose descriptions may not match their bodies. We formulate the problem as lifelong skill routing, a class-incremental continual learning problem. A solution must keep earlier skills selectable without suppressing new ones. Existing approaches fall short, since continually retraining the router risks catastrophic forgetting and rewriting methods either ignore similar skills or require per-skill feedback. We therefore propose Skill++, which rewrites only the name and description of each incoming skill, without router training or labeled data. The new description states what the body supports, how the skill differs from its closest predecessor, and what related work it excludes. As a library grows to 731 skills over ten sessions, Skill++ selects all required skills for 76.3% of queries, versus 36.4% under the original metadata. Across three benchmarks and five LLM routers, it outperforms all compared approaches, and its gains carry over to the Codex CLI agent harness.
OpenAI and ServiceNow expand their partnership to bring OpenAI models and agents into ServiceNow and ServiceNow workflows into ChatGPT and Codex.