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arXiv AI Papers

Language Models that Play Chess and Explain Their Moves

Modern chess engines are silent experts: they play at a superhuman level, but do not offer explanations for their play. On the other hand, language models (LMs) can generate plausible-sounding explanations, but their weak playing strength limits the utility of their explanations. We introduce Queen, a 4B-parameter chess-language model that can explain its moves and plans while playing at the level of a typical Grandmaster. Our novel framework enables domain-specific reasoning through complementary components: an encoder-decoder architecture and an iterative distillation algorithm. This architecture integrates a silent expert chess encoder with an instruction-tuned LM through cross-attention, which we train via a question-answering curriculum to extract chess concepts from the encoder's representations. Building on this domain-adapted model, we iteratively improve its explanations with a natural-language analog of the Bellman update: the model analyzes the positions after its top candidate moves and consolidates them into an explanation of the current position, which is then distilled back into the model. Over seven iterations, our model gains over 900 Elo points (1782 to 2697), substantially surpassing all frontier models on both playing strength and puzzle accuracy, despite containing three orders of magnitude fewer parameters. Furthermore, LM-based evaluations show that our explanations are fluent and approach GPT-5.6-Sol (high) in coherence. The generality of our architecture and training procedure suggests a recipe for applying language models to domains where silent expert encoders are available, like games, robotics, and computer use.

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arXiv AI Papers

FrugalEvo: Towards Cost-Aware LLM-Guided Program Evolution

LLM-guided evolutionary methods, such as AlphaEvolve, have emerged as powerful approaches for challenging computational optimization problems, such as circle packing. However, prior work typically optimizes performance gain over a fixed number of iterations. We argue that practical optimization should maximize gain per unit cost. To this end, we propose FrugalEvo, a cost-aware evolutionary framework where a stronger, higher-cost LLM explores solution strategies, and a cheaper LLM implements them and iteratively refines the resulting code. We also design a cache-efficient evolution process, where our harness and prompts maximize the sharing of prefixes across different evolution steps, to improve cache reuse. To measure solution quality throughout a fixed cost budget, we introduce Budget-Aware Area Under the Curve (BA-AUC), defined as the area under the best-so-far evaluation score curve over cumulative LLM cost, up to the budget. Across 10 mathematical and systems optimization tasks, FrugalEvo matches or surpasses state-of-the-art baselines, including OpenEvolve, ShinkaEvolve, AdaEvolve, and EvoX, in final solution quality and achieves higher BA-AUC on 9 tasks. It also achieves higher average performance than these baselines on 10 algorithmic optimization tasks from ALE-Bench-Lite. Notably, on circle packing, FrugalEvo achieves new state-of-the-art performance with GPT-5.6 Terra and Luna for only 1.68 USD and with GLM-5.3 and its Flash variant for only 0.55 USD, matching or surpassing all baselines, including multi-agent methods such as CORAL and SwarmResearch, which cost approximately 50 USD on average.

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arXiv AI Papers

Threat-Preserving Representation Sensitivity in Agent-Security Benchmarks

Security benchmarks for LLM-based agents often report the attack success rate (ASR) as a measure of model robustness and use these scores to compare different models and defense mechanisms, assuming that they describe the security of the agent. In this paper, we explore whether it also influences the benchmark's measurement. To measure the effect of the benchmark representation, we introduce threat-preserving representation sensitivity (TPRS), which measures how much the ASR changes when we change the agent-visible representation while holding the underlying task, harmful action, security policy, ground truth, environment, and the evaluation criteria fixed. On Agent Security Bench (ASB), replacing threat-related tool names with threat-neutral names raises the committed attack success rate by 11.67 percentage points on GPT-5-mini and by 13.21 points on Claude Haiku 4.5. On MCPTox, replacing the original neutral tool name with an explicit threat-related name lowers the ASR by 11.00 percentage points on GPT-5-mini and 4.11 points on Claude Haiku 4.5. On AgentDojo, adding threat-related wording to the attack-relevant tool changes ASR by only 0.50 percentage points on GPT-4o-mini, yet the benign utility falls by 5.36 points on tasks requiring that tool. We ran an experiment on MCPTox where we observed that a threat-neutral name matched on token count, length, and casing reproduces most of the shift produced by the threat-explicit name (8.54 of 11.00 points on GPT-5-mini). The results show that a security score measured under one representation may fail to generalize across threat-preserving representations of the same security problem. Robustness claims should therefore be supported by performance across a controlled set of threat-preserving representations rather than relying on a single representation-dependent score.

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arXiv AI Papers

Writerslogic at the CLEF 2026 SimpleText Track: Multi-Candidate LLM Simplification and Stacked Complexity Spotting

We describe the Writerslogic team's participation in the CLEF 2026 SimpleText shared task, addressing Task 1 (text simplification) and Task 2 (complexity spotting). For Task 1, we develop a multi-candidate generation pipeline using GPT-4o-mini that produces five simplification candidates per sentence at varying temperatures, then selects the best candidate using a reference-free scoring heuristic that rewards compression, source word retention, Cochrane Plain Language Summary vocabulary usage, and lexical simplicity. On Task 1.1 (sentence-level simplification), our Claude Sonnet 4 submission achieves SARI 47.43 and BLEU 14.21, the top-ranked sentence-level system (3rd on the combined Task 1 leaderboard, behind two document-level submissions). For Task 2, we fine-tune a DeBERTa-v3-large NLI model on 350K labeled (source, sentence) pairs, framing hallucination detection as natural language inference. The model reads the most relevant source sentence as premise and the candidate as hypothesis, directly learning to distinguish grounded from hallucinated content. On Task 2.1 (binary overgeneration identification), our fine-tuned DeBERTa system achieves 0.8081 document-level macro F1 (0.8085 in our best ensemble), the top-ranked entry within the identification track and 2nd among teams overall, behind AIIR Lab (0.8197). On Task 2.2 (multi-class error classification), our best submission reaches 0.804 multiclass accuracy, ranking 2nd among unique teams behind AIIR Lab (0.827). We evaluate both tasks on English and multilingual biomedical text from Cochrane systematic reviews.

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arXiv AI Papers

D2K-Bench: Can LLM Agents Turn Expert Designs into Efficient GPU Kernels?

GPU kernels generated by large language model (LLM) agents can remain less efficient than expert implementations, but runtime alone does not reveal how the gap relates to design discovery and implementation. We introduce D2K-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark of 26 tasks and 85 workloads that measures how effectively agents translate expert design guidance into efficient GPU kernels. The guidance covers L1: high-level algorithmic insights, L2: dataflow design, and L3: low-level optimization tricks, including dependencies among these levels. Pairwise runs with and without guidance share task descriptions, workloads, tools, hardware, and a 350-turn budget. Complementary assessments examine independently proposed designs and the design properties implemented in generated code. Across five models on NVIDIA B200 GPUs, guidance raises correctness over 130 model-task pairs from 93.1% to 98.5% and increases the Performance Score over all 26 tasks from 1.46 to 1.95. For the three frontier models with correct submissions on all 26 tasks in both runs (GPT-6-Astra, Claude-Opus-4.8, and GPT-5.6-Sol), geometric mean speedup increases from 1.69to 2.49. Across all five models, the mean combined implementation score increases from 57 to 70 out of 100. These results show the value of expert design guidance while identifying design properties that remain unimplemented.

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arXiv AI Papers

EvoRiskBench: An Evolving Benchmark for Runtime Security Risks in Workspace Agents

Workspace agents combine large language models with execution harnesses to perform stateful, multi-step tasks that access or modify external resources. Existing benchmarks leave gaps in executable coverage of their runtime security risks, while evolving model capabilities, harnesses, tools, and threats motivate benchmark evolution. We introduce EvoRiskBench, an evolving benchmark organized around the EP-Path-EF framework, which links an initial risk entry point to a one-hop technical effect through an agent-mediated risk path. The framework defines nine entry-point categories and five effect categories; a 20-participant study supports their interpretability and classification consistency on representative cases. Guided by this framework, an automated end-to-end workflow constructs and executes risk cases in isolated environments and independently verifies outcomes using runtime traces and environment states. The benchmark provides a reproducible dataset of 450 adversarial tasks across six scenarios. We evaluate nine model-harness configurations spanning three models (GPT-5.6 Sol, DeepSeek-V4-Pro-0813, and Claude Opus 5) and three harnesses (Claude Code, Codex, and OpenClaw). Our results reveal substantial vulnerabilities across systems. The most vulnerable configuration, Codex with DeepSeek-V4-Pro-0813, reaches a 68.44% attack success rate (ASR), indicating that configuration of workspace agent is insufficient to ensure secure autonomous execution. ASR varies more across models than harnesses, and harness differences depend on the model. The benchmark cases and evaluation platform will be released after completion of artifact safety and reproducibility checks.

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