Anthropic
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Google has released its latest frontier model, Gemini 4 Carbon, offering "significant gains" in coding, agentic tasks, and cybersecurity. In an announcement on Wednesday, Google…
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The frontier lab is lifting the curtain on how users spend money on its models ahead of a planned IPO.
How Deterministic SAST and AI Security Agents Divide the Work: Coverage, Harness Policy and Cost in Snyk VulnBench 2.0
We ask what AI coding agents and AI security harnesses find that deterministic static application security testing (SAST) does not, and what they miss that SAST catches. VulnBench 2.0 is a benchmark of 108 hand-curated, attacker-reachable vulnerabilities in 20 open-source web applications in Go, JavaScript/TypeScript, Python and Java; 62 flow across more than one file. A finding is credited only if it locates the vulnerability's attacker-controlled source and its dangerous sink, each within two lines. We evaluate nine productized configurations under one blind protocol: the Snyk Code static analyzer, Claude Code's /security-review with three model and effort settings (one with the Snyk MCP server), Codex Security with GPT-5.6 Luna, Terra and Sol, and the DeepSec scanner with two model backends. Snyk Code reached 82.4% macro recall (89 of 108) and Claude Code with Opus 5 at xhigh effort 79.3% (85 of 108); they disagree on 28 vulnerabilities, split 16 to 12, too few to tell them apart. Neither engine was sufficient alone: together they reached 101 of 108, the ceiling of all seven comparable configurations combined, and the AI configurations also reported at least seven real vulnerabilities that the reference set did not contain and Snyk Code did not report. What an AI engine misses depends on its harness as much as on its model: without Claude Code's built-in review policy, the same model matched 16 instead of 9 of the 20 vulnerabilities in the classes that policy excludes or restricts (supplementary run on 19 of 20 applications); Codex Security with GPT-5.6 Sol located 80 vulnerabilities at file level but 34 at line level; DeepSec's model-free file selection kept a file from only 56 of the 108 flows. Coverage and cost were only loosely related. The harness, fixtures, reference sets and all run data are public.
DecompGym: Benchmarking LLM Agents on Designing Decomposition Algorithms
Benders decomposition and column generation solve large optimization problems by passing cuts, columns, and dual values between a master problem and subproblems, and are hard to implement correctly. Large language models now automate parts of algorithm design, which points toward agents that build decomposition solvers for new problems. As a first step toward such agents, we study how well current coding agents design and implement these two algorithms, and how they fail. We introduce DecompGym, 81 instances from nine problem families (five Benders, four column generation), in which an agent writes a solver for a prescribed method. Each solver must meet three criteria: execution within a 60-second time limit; numerical feasibility together with a method audit, in which an LLM judge reads the solver's code; and an objective within 1% of the stored optimal objective. We evaluate 12 GPT, Claude, and Gemini models running in coding-agent tools. Over up to ten attempts, we compare independent regeneration with reflection, which first diagnoses the failure. On the first attempt, two models solve every instance and seven solve more than 90%. Most Benders failures (48 of 62) are missing or suboptimal solutions. The most common column-generation failure is a method-audit rejection. Output checks alone would accept 93 of the 108 attempts that fail the method audit. The most common rejection, an optimalif, occurs 96 times, 92 of them in one model.Reflection turns 66% of retries into successes, compared with 39% for regeneration, and it repairs method-audit failures, for which the judge names the defecective gaps. Agents for decomposition therefore need checks on how a solver reaches its answer and feedback that locates the error. The benchmark is available at https://github.com/SIKAI-C/DecompGym.
VCs will make billions on Anthropic’s IPO, but Amazon is set to make much (much) more
Massive note conversions reveal the true extent of Amazon's ownership in Anthropic.
AI for Science expands to foundations and institutions
We’re highlighting 20 scientific foundations, institutions, and research groups from around the world that we’ve partnered with in an expansion of our AI for Science program.
Who’s really in charge at Anthropic after the IPO?
Here's a clear explanation of Anthropic's incredibly complex governance structure.