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OpenAI

2610documentos

83últimos 7 días

arXiv AI Papers

Harm Laundering in GPT Models: Evidence That Gender Discrimination Is Transformed Rather Than Reduced Across Safety-Trained Generations

Safety evaluations for large language models rely on surface-form classifiers that report declining harm scores across model generations. We provide evidence that this methodology is systematically incomplete: explicit discriminatory content is transformed rather than removed. We call this harm laundering. Analysing 450,000 gender-directed completions across 15 models spanning GPT-2 through to GPT-5 (OpenAI GPT lineage; three demographic conditions), we show that sexual violence clusters prevalent in GPT-2 women-directed output disappear by GPT-4, while men-directed completions gain positive representational territory (caregiving, emotional range, ally identity) that women-directed completions do not. The pattern is most visible at GPT-5: Topic~5 (1,997~documents) frames breast cancer as a men's rights debate, while zero equivalent clusters appear in women-directed output. Three independent classifiers score this content as non-toxic. Sentiment scores invert at GPT-4: early models demean women; later models over-correct. Topic diversity in women-directed completions falls 36\% relative to men at the GPT-4 alignment boundary (W/M~= 0.58, from 0.91 at GPT-2). REGARD representational harm disparity correlates with release date (ρ= +0.55, p = .034) while Detoxify does not (ρ= -0.23, p = .42): toxicity scores fall as representational harm grows. We formalise harm laundering as a three-criteria test and provide a three-stage detection protocol applicable to any generative model. Within the OpenAI GPT lineage, toxicity score reduction is not a sufficient proxy for harm reduction.

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arXiv AI Papers

Inference-Engine Fingerprinting Attacks are Practical: Exploring Model-Driven Environmental Discovery, Exploitation, and Escape

Frontier AI models are rapidly gaining the ability to exploit vulnerabilities in complex pieces of software. The risk is not theoretical, as evidenced by recent sandbox escapes performed by frontier models at OpenAI and Anthropic. Discussions of how to sandbox inference stack components often focus on components other than the inference engine itself (e.g., network proxies or code execution environments). However, the inference engine is an attractive target for a misaligned model. For example, if a model can trigger exploits in that engine merely by generating specially-crafted output tokens, the model can initiate a multi-step, to-the-bare-metal exploit chain in the engine, without relying on vulnerabilities in other components of the inference stack, and without assistance from externally-provided, maliciously-crafted input tokens. In this paper, we show that a misaligned model can perform inference engine fingerprinting to determine the specific engine (e.g., vLLM, SGLang) which executes the model. Once the engine has been fingerprinted, the model can leverage engine-specific exploits to take control of the engine using only carefully-selected output tokens. We provide concrete examples of model fingerprints in five popular engines, and demonstrate how realistic agentic harnesses allow a model to leverage those fingerprints to identify the local engine. We also describe a proof-of-concept, to-the-bare-metal exploit chain that originates from a fingerprinted (and subsequently compromised) inference engine. We conclude by discussing several ways that inference engines could be changed to make fingerprinting attacks more difficult.

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