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Anthropic

1125documentos

102últimos 7 días

arXiv AI Papers

Door-in-the-Face Requests and Refusal Behaviour in Large Language Models

Does the door-in-the-face technique work on language models? In humans, a large request that is refused makes a smaller follow-up request more likely to be granted. We test this on nine production models from three providers: each model refuses a large request, then receives a smaller version of the same request, and we compare its compliance with asking directly. The answer depends on the model. On Anthropic's frontier models the technique works: Opus 5 answers the smaller request 65.8% of the time after refusing the larger one, against 29.3% when asked directly. On the frontier models of OpenAI and Google, and on Haiku 4.5, it backfires, lowering compliance by 15.5 to 23.0 points. A control locates the effect: a refused large request on an unrelated topic does less than the related one on all nine models, so the concession itself matters everywhere, while the reaction to having just refused something differs by model family. The technique does not transfer to refusals drawn from public benchmarks. What decides whether a retreat can work is what the request asks for: rewriting 265 refused requests for usable instructions into requests for explanations of the same topic removed the refusal in 263 cases. Human influence techniques port to language models one model family at a time.

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Introducing Claude Fable 5.1 on AWS

Claude Fable 5.1 is now available on Amazon Bedrock and Claude Platform on AWS. This post covers Claude Fable 5.1's improvements, the Enterprise Frontier Safeguards for keeping your data in a cloud environment you control, and how to start building with the model on Amazon Bedrock.

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arXiv AI Papers

Defense-as-Skill: Evolving Runtime Guard Skill for Skill-Augmented Agents

Skill-augmented agents load reusable skills as persistent runtime context, improving task performance but also giving malicious skills a durable channel for steering future actions. Such skills may leak secrets, corrupt code, bypass approvals, or stage data for exfiltration only after a concrete user task and workspace state make the unsafe action appear useful. This makes pre-install vetting insufficient and calls for runtime, task-conditioned protection. We propose Defense-as-Skill, a defense paradigm that implements the runtime guard itself as an installable, inspectable, and editable skill. Our guard, SkillSonar, runs alongside untrusted task skills and checks sensitive actions against the user's task boundary, routing each action to an allow, replan, or confirmation decision without modifying the underlying agent runtime. To study this setting, we construct SCOPE-R, a task-conditioned dataset covering 6 risk families and 21 sub-categories, with 206 attack-confirmed malicious instances and 43 benign tasks. We then improve SkillSonar on the SCOPE-R training subset using runtime guard-skill evolution, a Monte-Carlo Tree Search procedure that evolves the on-disk guard skill from feedback on the rollouts. Across Claude Code and OpenClaw, the evolved guard substantially reduces attack success while maintaining a favorable safety-utility trade-off. On repeated GLM-5 runs, SkillSonar reduces ID ASR from 0.482 to 0.104 and OOD ASR from 0.606 to 0.115. Further analyses demonstrate transfer across victim models, held-out risk families, and external benchmarks, as well as retained protection against adaptive attackers. Ablations further show that explicit safety responsibility assignment and the skill-native representation are both important to the observed gains.

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